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In this paper, we analyze in quantitative terms the influence of family 
pattern of corporate investment, using firm-level data from Indonesia, Ko
the Philippines, and Thailand to regress the investment function and fo
family ownership structure that characterizes East Asian corporate go
results present evidence that family-controlled firms, the majority of th
data set, face more severe internal financing constraints than non-fa
commonly assumed to permit s




￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ1鍨￿ 愀￿ 1. Introduction 
The East Asia region, while recording remarkable economic growth over
experienced a serious financial crisis in 1997. In the wake of the crisis,
there was some kind of relationship between the structure of corporate 
 the long term, 
 the view that 
governance in 
East Asia and spread of the crisis served to popularize research on corporate 
governance.  
suggests that 
 this type of 
reholders and 
entrepreneurs is less of a problem than conflict of interest between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders. In such case, it is argued that there is a strong 
at would have 
egative image. 
industrialize, led the development of Japanese industry. Even from the viewpoint of 
corporate governance, Zaibatsu headquarters had efficiently monitored subsidiaries, 
ermore, 
 bank system 
yed a role in 
promoting investment in Keiretsu firms.  
Our study is based on two hypotheses, one positive and one negative, regarding 
family-controlled firms, and quantitatively analyzes the influence of family control on 
the pattern of corporate investment using firm-level data from Indonesia, Korea, 
A large amount of research regarding East Asian corporate governance 
many firms in East Asia are actually dominated by specific families. In
family ownership structure, consistency of interest between sha
possibility that the controlling shareholder may expropriate profits th
otherwise gone to outside investors.  
Previously, family-controlled conglomerates did not have an entirely n
On the contrary, it is accepted that the pre-war Zaibatsu, through their strong drive to 
while, based on this monitoring, functioning as their main source of funds. Furth
it is the common consensus that Keiretsu, which centered on the main
after the breakup of the Zaibatsu after the Second World War, pla
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ2鍨￿ 愀￿ Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand to regress the capital investmen
this end, we first classify the sample data into family-controlle
nonfamily-controlled firms (independent firms), and then divide the sam
pre-crisis and post-crisis. By comparing these two groups between two p
t function. To 
d firms and 
ple period into 
eriods, we find 
that family-controlled firms faced more severe internal financing constraints than did 
nonfamily-controlled firms.   
stitutions and 
 in achieving 
rnal financing 
constraints. In fact, one can argue that nonfamily-controlled firms positively pushed 
forward capital markets and bank financing and that, by virtue of these investments, 
traints were released to a relatively high degree. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the corporate governance in 
empirical analysis based on investment function, Section 
4 offers concluding remarks. 
 
2. Corporate Governance in East Asia 
Principle-agent theory arises in a business management context associated with 
behavioral studies of employer-contractor or employer-employee interactions, but it can 
be applied to public and non-profit settings as well. The central dilemma investigated 
by present principal-agent theory is how to get the employee or manager (the agent) to 
This result suggests that it is difficult to state that the financial in
central firms within family-controlled affiliated firms were effective
smooth financing of investment in the conglomerate and alleviating inte
internal financing cons
East Asia, Section 3 performs 
 
2.1 Agency Problems throughout Firm Organization   
 
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ3鍨￿ 愀￿ act in the best interests of the employer or shareholder (the principal) w
has an
hen the agent 
 informational advantage over the principal and has different interests from the 
refers to the 
difficulties the shareholder has in assuring that the entrepreneur is giving his best 
effort, rather than shirking or perking to maximize his own benefits.   
rinciple-agent 
 governance is 
 the potential agency problem between shareholders and entrepreneurs, and 
deal with the mechanism to ensure that managers act in the best interest of 
shareholders.  
out the agent 
relationship between shareholders and entrepreneurs, is a presupposition of the case of 
dispersed ownership of corporate stock according to comparative multiple shareholders, 
, even 
on of firms by 
La Porta, et al. (1999) is the first research to reveal this fact. They focus on the 
ownership structure of 700 firms in 27 countries worldwide, identify the ultimate 
shareholders of firms, and accordingly classify firms into 6 groups: widely held firms 
which actually have no controlling shareholder, family controlled firms, state owned 
principal. 
In the case of an agency problem between shareholder and manager, it 
From the social standpoint, the typical agency cost derived from p
relationship is inefficient resource waste. The main objective of corporate
to alleviate
 
2.2 Family Controlled Firms 
 
Originally, the corporate governance problem, which occurs through
as can typically be seen in large firms in Japan and the United States.    However
in large firms worldwide, concentrated ownership and actual dominati
specific families are extensive.   
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ4鍨￿ 愀￿ firms, widely held financial institution owned firms, widely held non-financial 
rcent. Table 1 
at owns more 
than 20 percent stock in the United Kingdom, all 20 firms are widely held, and even in 
the U.S. and Japan, the overwhelmingly majority of firms are widely held.   
 while in Hong 
half of firms are family-controlled. 
Looking at the total of 27 countries, family-controlled firms account for a substantial 30 
percent, similar to the figure for widely held firms (36 percent).3  
 
ship structure 
is of ownership 
structure of East Asian firms. They study 3000 publicly traded companies in 9 countries 
d they succeed in 
majority in the 
in terms of market 
e from 64 percent in Thailand to 96 percent in Singapore, and 
1  Refers to firms, nonprofit organizations, employee-holding firms which are controlled by pension 
funds, mutual funds, and voting-trust certificate. 
2  Refers to the largest 20 firms in each country in terms of market capitalization of common stock at 
the end of 1995. 
3  They focus on middle scale firms, and find that among 27 countries, 45% of firms are 
family-controlled firms, which largely exceed dispersed firms (24%). 
4  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) define cross-holding differently from Claessens, 
Djankov and Lang (2000). The former classifies it as dispersed firms, whereas the latter classifies it 
according to subject of cross-holding. 
 
corporation owned firms, and miscellaneous.1 
They focus on large firms2 with minimum held ownership of 20 pe
shows the result; it presents that there is no firm with a shareholder th
On the other hand, all sample firms are family-controlled in Mexico,
Kong, Argentina, Belgium, Greece and Israel, at least 
2.3 Family Dominance in East Asian Firm 
 
La Porta, et al. (1999) triggered research relating to corporate owner
worldwide. Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) focus on detailed analys
and regions in East Asia, based on information at that time, 1996. An
identifying ultimate controlling owners.4  Their sample firms occupy the 
9 regions in terms of the number of listed companies. Furthermore 
capitalization, they rang
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ5鍨￿ 愀￿ they largely reflect the characteristics of listed firms in this region.   
Table 2 presents the results. In Japan, widely held firms occupy 80 p
firms compared to 10 percent family controlled. Originally, in the East Asi
the view of ownership structure, Japanese firms were seen as outsid
ercent of total 
a region, from 
ers. To put it 
another way, in regions and countries outside of Japan, family-controlled firms account 
for the largest proportion of the five groups - over 70 percent for Indonesia and over 50 
percent in most cases. As shown above, in the East Asian region, excluding Japan, 
ms is prevalent.5  
 
2.4 Structure of Family Domination 
 
ic family. It is 
 controlling shareholders of multiple firms, and there are 
ther firms (so 
actual owner of the sub-subsidiaries.   
In the case of designing so-called business groups under family control of many 
companies, it is fairly popular for each company to be connected through the use of 
-shareholdings 
In the context of this complicated ownership structure, it is not possible to find who 
5  Khanthavit, Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang (2004) research non-financial firms in Thailand, and 
Anuchitworawong, Souma and Wiwattanakantang (2003) analyze the corporate controlling structure, 
focusing on financial institutions in Thailand. 
6  Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) demonstrate that 39% of all sample firms have pyramiding 
ownership structure, and 10% of all sample firms have cross-holding ownership structure. 
 
family ownership of listed fir
As stated above, family-controlled firms are firms controlled by a specif
not rare for a family to become
many cases in which those firms become large shareholders of many o
called sub-subsidiaries). In situation like that, we can recognize that the family is the 
pyramid ownership structure. In addition, there are cases of cross
between group companies.6  
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ6鍨￿ 愀￿ has the most voting rights by just looking at the immediate ownership
only possible to identify the ultimate shareholder by tracing cr
. Instead, it is 
oss-shareholdings and 
ure.   
he problem of 
voting rights exceeding cash-flow rights.7 Voting rights indicate the actual control of 
firms, while cash-flow rights the ownership of firms. 
rs easily with 
sh-flow rights. That is because when voting rights 
exceed cash-flow rights, the controlling shareholders’ portion remains relatively lower 
when the firms experience financial loss.     
 
tion, although 
 For the 
time being, there are two different perspectives.   
One of two perspectives is controlling shareholders expropriate profits that should 
o reconcile the 
d ownership of 
 managers and 
shareholders. Regarding East Asian firms, this theory does not hold. In the case of 
family ownership firms, the families hold essential control over firms, and, in most 
cases, they also appoint managers with interests that coincide with theirs. Therefore, 
7  Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) present that in East Asian sample firms, voting rights exceed 
cash flow rights generally by 10 percent to 20 percent, and the majority are firms without disparity of 
voting rights and cash flow rights. 
pyramid ownership structure and bringing out ultimate ownership struct
There is another important side to this family ownership structure, t
Expropriation of outside investors by controlling shareholders occu
separation of voting rights and ca
2.5 Inefficiency of Family Control 
 
How does one evaluate family ownership structure? In regard to this ques
many scholars have examined it, an accepted view remains largely unknown.
otherwise go to outside investors. The subject of corporate governance is t
interests of managers with those of shareholders. In the case of disperse
large firms in Japan and the U.S., there is a conflict of interest between
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ7鍨￿ 愀￿ the conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and outside
becomes the main issue, as Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest. The
possibility that expropriation of outside
 shareholders 
 result is the 
 shareholders will occur grows as the voting 
We will focus first on the agency problem between controlling shareholders and 
outside shareholders, emphasizing the problems and inefficiency of the family 
 
 
The 1997 Asian crisis exposed the problems regarding family ownership structure in 
 a hypothesis that the weak corporate governance, 
of outside 
everal studies 
Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman (2000) suggest controlling families treat 
outside investors well to finance their activities when there are bright economic 
n, when the 
side investors, 
resulting in more severe stock market declines and exchange rate depreciation than in 
that of countries with sufficient investor protection.   
To examine this hypothesis empirically, they focus on the price movements of 
currency exchange and stock market in 25 emerging countries from 1997 to 1998. They 
rights held by controlling shareholders  increase.   
ownership structure.   
2.6 Empirical Analysis on Weakness of Investor Protection 
East Asia. Furthermore, there is
coupled with elements of family ownership structure and poor protection 
investors, triggered the crisis and compounded the impact. There are s
that examine this hypothesis empirically.   
prospects; however, in countries with insufficient investor protectio
economic environment deteriorates, inside shareholders expropriate out
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ8鍨￿ 愀￿ show that country-specific measures of corporate governance 8   rela
protection perform better than such standard macroeconomic variables
accounts, financial deficit, and cumulative external debt at explaining
ting to legal 
 as balance of 
 the extent of 
ing the crisis.  
Obata (2002) examines the correlation of legal investor protection and pyramiding 
ownership structure in East Asia. He compares the stock’s market valuation of firms in 
to pyramiding 
s in countries 
igher for firms 
belonging to pyramiding structure in countries with insufficient investor protection. 
Although, this correlation depends on which position in the pyramid chain the firm 
n is lower than 
n of this result is that risk-sharing across affiliated-firms in East 
Asia did not function well, as the controlling shareholders tunnel the profits in their 
best interest, resulting in profits of firms in the lower pyramid chain being siphoned to 
ones in the upper chain.   
We continue by looking at some empirical research on the relationship between 
ownership concentration by family control and the Asian crisis. Lemmon and Lins 
(2003) study the effect of ownership structure on firm value during the East Asian 
8  The indices used in this study are judicial efficiency, corruption, rule of law, enforceable minority 
shareholder rights, anti-directors rights, creditor rights, accounting standards at the time, 1990, most 
of which draw on La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). 
currency depreciation and stock market decline of emerging markets dur
financial distress between independent firms and firms belonging 
structure, and finds no significant difference between these two group
with sufficient investor protection; however, the stock’s market value is h
belongs; if it is in the bottom of the chain, conversely, the market valuatio
the independent firm.   
His interpretatio
 
2.7 Family Control and Asian Crisis   
 
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ9鍨￿ 愀￿ financial crisis that began in July 1997. They focus on two factors 
structure: separ
of ownership 
ation of voting rights and cash-flow rights and managers effectively 
ian countries, 
they find Tobin’s Q ratios of those firms with a separation between voting rights and 
cash-flow rights declined twelve percent more than Q ratios in other firms during the 
have effective 
r firms during 
he investment 
environment and raises the incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate 
minority shareholders. Moreover, the large separation between cash-flow rights and 
voting rights suggests that insiders have higher incentive to engage in expropriation.9  
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) indicate a relatively small number of families 
effectively control most East Asian economies, and these families have even had a 
 are the business 
 the Philippines. 
 the evolution of the 
9  Mitton (2002) investigates the correlation between ownership concentration and corporate 
performance during the crisis, using the ratio of controlling shareholder’s cash-flow rights to total 
cash-flow rights as a measure of ownership concentration, and finds that raising the controlling 
shareholder’s cash-flow rights ratio by 10% increases per share earning ratio by 2.6%. Different from 
Lemmon and Lins (2003), his findings support the view that controlling shareholder plays an active 
and positive role in corporate governance. He interprets this result as without involvement in 
management, the controlling shareholder does not necessarily have a conflict of interest with the 
minority shareholder, in fact the controlling shareholder has a strong incentive to monitor the 
management, thereby avoiding expropriation by management.  
controlling the firm.   
Using detailed ownership data from over 800 firms in eight East As
crisis period, and Tobin’s Q ratios of those firms in which managers 
control over the firms declined twenty percent more than Q ratios in othe
the crisis period. This evidence indicates that the crisis deteriorates t
   
2.8 Possibilities of Crony Capitalism 
 
strong effect on the economic policy of governments. Cases in point
empire of the Suharto family in Indonesia and Imelda-Marcos family in
These families’ powerful abilities extend to possible influence on
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ10鍨￿ 愀￿ countries’ legal systems, for instance anti-monopoly law and commercial law
to trade and foreign currency manage
, in addition 
ment policies, macro financial policies, contracting 
 opportunities 
directly or indirectly by lobbying government agencies and public officials. At the same 
time, the government prefers to accept their interference if the preferential treatment to 
hese firms and 
es.   
 and government in East Asia has 
strong characteristic of crony capitalism. It may distort the distribution of income and 
resources and worsen the distress in case of economic crisis.   
on-making by 
family-controlled firms and government, not based on market mechanisms, was not 




They exerted considerable influence in Japanese industry from the Meiji era to the 
Second World War. The evaluation on those feudal family-controlled firms is 
controversial; however, Morikawa (1980) and Kikkawa (1996) indicate that there is 
consensus that Zaibatsu firms had strong industrialization will and led industry 
process of public investment and expenditure. 
These family-controlled firms are able to increase their profit-earning
these firms can secure its power base. The interdependence structure of t
government can be interpreted as indicative of high incentive for both sid
The interdependence structure of these firms
 
2.9 Growth Promoting Effect of Family-Controlled Firms’ System 
 
It has been argued that the cooperative or integrated policy decisi
of government and corporate sector is one of the institutional underp
contribute to achievement of the miraculous economic development in Ea
There existed a large number of family-controlled firms in Japan, i.e., Z
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ11鍨￿ 愀￿ development. 
Moreover, there are positive effects of Zaibatsu even from the view
governance. For instance, Okazaki (1997, 1999) states that Zaibatsu
efficiently monitored10 subsidiaries and were positively evaluated for f
families, or so-called Banto, played a key role; later, professional m
 of corporate 
 headquarters 
unctioning as 
main funds supplier based on this monitoring.11 Teranishi (2003) points out that 
regarding the governance within the Zaibatsu group firms, initially the Zaibatsu 
anagers gradually 
nformation on 
portant.   
Friedman, Johnson and Mitton (2003) indicate that controlling shareholder families 
propped the group firms in financial distress by their own fortune during the period of 
at with a poor 
 tunneling (as in Johnson, La Porta, 
opez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2000) are two sides of the same coin. When the 
o the firm, propping possibly happens if the 
going concern will be interest for controlling shareholders.   
 
policies of GHQ 
after Japan’s surrender. During the process, equity held by Zaibatsu families and 
10  Okazaki (1997, 1999) adduces some examples as proof of the efficient monitoring mechanism by 
Zaibatsu headquarter such as: dispatch of board members of affiliated firms by Zaibatsu headquarter, 
ex ante report regarding important issues to Zaibatsu headquarter by affiliated firms, authority by 
Zaibatsu headquarter to shuffle personnel of key posts of affiliated firms. 
11  While agreeing with Okazaki (1997, 1999), Miyajima (2004) also indicates some costs of Zaibatsu, 
that the Zaibatsu family is risk averse and has a strong preference of maintaining feudal ownership, 
therefore the investment in affiliated firms is largely constrained by their liquidity and leverage. 
were employed and a managers’ monitoring system, which relied on i
divisions and holding companies within the organization, became more im
economic anarchy after crisis, and analyze the background. They argue th
investor protection legal system, propping and
L
externally negative shock is not so large t
2.10 Investment Promoting Effect of Keiretsu Firms 
 
The Zaibatsu were promptly dismantled as one part of the occupation 
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ12鍨￿ 愀￿ holding companies was transferred to the private sector. The sudden dis
stable shareholders threatened the independence of management in Z
The way to deal with this problem is the cross-holding of stocks acros
firms.12 As the result, such six big bank-cent
appearance of 
aibatsu firms. 
s old Zaibatsu 
ered affiliated firms groups as Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuji, Ichikan and Sanwa formed.  
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990, 1991) focus on these Keiretsu firms, and 
 Kashyap and 
tressed firms, 
ressed firms.13 
They find that Keiretsu-member firms and higher ratio of loans from their biggest 
financing banks are associated with the higher level of investment in the immediate 
d main bank 
and effects of 
ent. 
They classify manufacturing firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange into independent 
firms and Keiretsu firms, estimate Tobin’s Q investment function for these two groups, 
s. They argue 
iretsu finance, 
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990, 1991) demonstrate that groups of affiliated 
firms promoted investment not only in peacetime but also in Japan’s postwar period of 
12  Teranishi (2003) indicates that cross-holding within Zaibatsu firms was widespread from the 1930s. 
13  They define these firms as financially distressed firms if the interest coverage ratio (Business 
Income/Interest Paid) drops continuously below 1 for 2 periods. All sample firms are listed on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange Market. 
analyze them quantitively from a view of corporate finance. Hoshi,
Scharfstein (1990) investigate the relationship among financially dis
Keiretsu and main bank, using investment data from 125 financially dist
aftermath of a crisis. They interpret these results as the Keiretsu an
system lower the cost of financial distress.   
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) analyze the significance 
Keiretsu firms from the perspective of internal financing constraints on investm
and find independent firms face more severe internal financing constrain
that in the case of Keiretsu firms, as the bank is the core element of Ke
Keiretsu firms can avoid internal financing constraints.   
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ13鍨￿ 愀￿ financial distress.   
3. Empirical Analysis Based on Investment Function 
3.1 Two Assumptions 
 
 there are two 
ffects of controlling shareholders’ 
romoting 
investment and growth through smooth inter-group finance.   
Given the present circumstances, these two assumptions should not be absolutely 
vers the East 
nly applies to 
e Second World War. Secondly, the former estimates the 
ce; the latter 
measures the investment function. Direct comparability is impossible because analysis 
objective and means are different. 
research that 
the relationship between these two assumptions remains insufficient. In this 
paper, we focus on measuring the investment function with firm-level data for East 
Asian firms. We aim to illustrate the economic significance of corporate governance 





Relating to corporate governance symbolized by family-controlled firms,
assumptions. One emphasizes the negative e
expropriating outside investors; the other highlights the positive effects of p
contrasting. In the first place, the former view pertains to a study that co
Asian firms during the period around the Asian crisis; the latter mai
Japanese firms around th
relationship between corporate governance and corporate performan
Put another way, regarding the corporate governance in East Asia, 
clarifies 
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ14鍨￿ 愀￿ 3.2 Data and Model 
om Indonesia, 
he number of 
sample firms varies yearly. In 2000, the number is 395, with the most for Malaysia and 
the least for the Philippines (88). Table 3 presents the results. 
        
st rate (cost of 
funds); CASH, cash-flow; DEBT, debt ratio; and K, capital stock. Of these explanatory 
variables, ROA and R are the most standard factors according to Keynes’ investment 
14
 problem in an 
s independent 
xternal finance. 
However, given the agency problem between creditor and debtor (as in Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)), investment is affected by cash-flow－a relatively lower cost than other 
nt may occur between 
pproach with the 
ate governance 
and internal financing constraints of investment from the standpoint of relationship 
14  See Keynes (1936), the eleventh chapter. 
15  Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) is the first study to formulate this idea and analyze 
empirically the correlation between funds constraints and investment. They find that the cost of funds 
varies according to the kind, and firms finance their investments sequentially from cheaper ones, 
which they define as Financing Hierarchies”. It is argued that cash flow, regarded as the cheapest 
funds, definitely affects the level of investment. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) investigate 
empirically Japanese firms based on the same approach, and show that compared with independent 
firms, Keiretsu firms have lower sensitivity of investment to cash flow. 
 
We collect financial data from Worldscope for all non-financial firms fr
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand from 1994 to 2000. T
The basic model we estimate is: 
I＝F（ROA, R, CASH, DEBT, K）                          
in which, I indicates investment; ROA, return on total assets; R, intere
theory.  
Cash-flow conception is used when we take into account the financing
imperfect finance market; that is, as M&M theory suggests, investment i
of financing methods if the cost of using cash-flow is the same as that of e
financing methods. That suggests that different scales of investme
firms with abundant cash-flow and those without.15 We link this a
corporate governance factor to investigate the correlation between corpor
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ15鍨￿ 愀￿ between cash-flow and investment.   
Moreover, we include debt ratio into the model to control the cred
argued that a high debt ratio raises the credit risk, and makes it difficu
access external finance and, therefore, may constrain the investment. C
it risk.16 It is 
lt for firms to 
apital stock is 
taken to represent the scale of firms, since large-scale firms tend to invest in a high 
level based on the depreciation concept.   
 
 
We estimate the following regression models based on the basic model: 
I it /Kit-  = ai + b*(ROAit-1 - Rit-1) + c*(CASH it/K it-１)  ＋ d*DEBTi t - 1            ( 1 ) 
lized by K in formula (1). All variables used in this 
d assets 
come/fixed  assets 
          R: interest expense on Debt/ all interest bearing and capitalized lease obligations 
     CASH:  retained  earnings  +  depreciation 
r, and operating 
income, interest expense, and cash-flow by GDP deflator. We control for industry and 
year effects in all estimations (based on 2-digit SIC code), country dummy in some 
16  Regarding debt ratio, there is a hypothesis that debt contract exerts disciplinary mechanisms on 
corporate management. Jensen (1986, 1989) suggests firms with large amount of debt would manage 
more efficiently if creditors effectively monitor their debtors. And if efficient management promotes 
investment, we can expect a positive coefficient sign for debt ratio. But our findings show the sign is 
negative, which supports our hypothesis that debt ratio represents the credit risk. 
3.3 Estimated Model 
１
In which I and CASH are norma
study are defined as follows: 
          I: the expense related to the fixe
     ROA:  operating  in
     DEBT:  debt/total  assets 
     K:  fixed  assets 
We normalize investment and fixed assets by investment deflato
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ16鍨￿ 愀￿ estimations, and total assets denominated in US dollars17 in  some  estima
We use the random effects model in our regression analysis, and, a
abov
tions.  
s we describe 
e, our sample data is an unbalanced panel owing to different sample numbers by 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the investment ratio (I/K), cash-flow ratio 
(CASH/K) and debt ratio (DEBT), organized by country. First, the pre-crisis (i.e., 
94-1997) investment ratio ranges from 20 percent to 30 percent; 
ratio declines 
Second, the cash-flow ratio peaks in 1994 both on mean and median measures apart 
from Korea. It exhibits a clear declining trend after 1994, and falls to a negative value 
t g the marked 
 on mean and 
or the developed countries.18 
However, it shows an upward trend as a whole, except for Korea, in which it shifts 
between 40 percent and 50 percent. In 2000, the debt ratio is 40 percent for Indonesia, 
30 percent for Korea, 20 percent for the Philippines.19  
sults 
 
17  We convert the domestic currencies into US dollars, using exchange rate at the end of each year. The 
unit of US dollars is billion. 
18  Hanazaki and Thuy (2003) show the average debt ratio of large firms during the 1980s to 1990s is 
61% for Japan, 52% for United States, and 56% for France.   
19  We eliminate the outliers of our variables as follows: I/K＞300、ROA＞200、ROA＜-200、CASH/K
＞1000、CASH/K＜-500. 
year.  
pre-crisis refers to 19
however, post-crisis (i.e., post-crisis refers to 1998-2000) investment 
largely to 10 to 15 percent.   
for Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia in 1998 on mean measure reflec in
exacerbation.  
Third, the debt ratio distributes from 20 percent to 50 percent both
median measures, not necessarily higher than that f
 
3.4 Empirical Re
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ17鍨￿ 愀￿ Table 4 presents the regression results, using the pool data from t
countries. The coefficient estimates on net profit ratio (ROA－R) indicato
debt ratio indicator variable show significantly positive and negative resp
are consistent with the predicted ones. These results confirm tha
  he above five 
r variable and 
ectively, which 
t corporate investment 
in the five East Asian countries supports the theories relating to this aspect.   
In particular, a positive coefficient estimates on cash-flow indicator variable with a 
ds is relatively higher 
than that of internal funds owing to imperfection of financial market; consequently, the 
 influence on investment level.   
 
3.5 Effects of Family-Controlled Corporate Governance 
n investment of corporate governance 
le data into 
ment between 
these two groups by estimating the investment function.   
We combine my financial data with ownership data20 used in Claessens, Djankov 
ff in terms of 
aw on their measures and classify firms as 
t the controlling 
shareholder is a family. By doing so, our sample data from those five countries consists 
of 70 percent of family-controlled firms and 30 percent independent firms, which again 
confirms the extensive pervasion of family control. 
20  We are especially grateful to Joseph P. H. Fan for providing the ownership structure data used in 
Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000). 
high statistical significance suggest that the cost of external fun
availability of internal funds has considerable
 
Next, we analyze quantitatively the effects o
symbolized by family control. To this end, we classify our samp
family-controlled firms and independent firms, and compare the invest
and Lang (2000). They define controlling shareholders at the 20% cuto
direct and indirect voting rights. We dr
family-controlled firms and independent firms based on whether or no
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ18鍨￿ 愀￿ Table 5 presents the comparisons of main variables used in this paper
two groups. Family-controlled firms show a higher investment ratio, d
 between these 
ebt ratio and cost 
ent firms.   
he coefficient 
estimates on net profit rate (ROA－R) indicator variable are significantly positive in all 
specifications for both family-controlled firms and independent firms. There is no big 
. These results 
te there is similarity between the two groups in terms of effects of net profit rate 
 some peculiar 
impacts. 
However, the coefficient estimates on cash-flow indicator variable vary largely. They 
rms, but not 
 independent firms. The magnitude of the coefficients on cash-flow 
 rate by 0.7 
percentage point.   
In all specifications of both family-controlled firms and independent firms, the 
00 demonstrate highly 
sis.   
ashyap and 
Scharfstein (1991), this result suggests that family-controlled firms face more severe 
internal financing constraints of investment compared to independent firms. 
As Table 5 shows, family-controlled firms invest more relative to less cash-flow, 
compared to independent firms, resulting in higher dependence of external 
of funds and a lower profit ratio and cash-flow ratio compared to independ
Table 6 shows the regression results of investment functions. T
difference between the magnitudes of coefficients in the two groups either
indica
on investment, and it is difficult to conclude that family control exhibits
are significantly positive in all specifications for family-controlled fi
significant for
indicator variable is between 0.073-0.078 for family-controlled firms, raising cash-flow 
indicator variable by 10 percentage points increase the investment
coefficients estimates on year dummies of 1998, 1999 and 20
significant negative values, indicating the macro negative shock of the cri
In contrast to the study on Keiretsu firms in Japan by Hoshi, K
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ19鍨￿ 愀￿ finance—high debt ratio. Consequently, the result suggests that the relatively high cost 
of external finance leads to investment that is largely constrained by internal funds.   
3.6 Examination on Debt-overhang  
 
Regarding the financing problem of investment, there is another important 
at firms with 
trouble attracting new investment even if they bring in a profit, 
ed first to the 
payment of existing debt.  
Measuring directly the debt-overhang problem in East Asia is a bit tricky. In this 
. Given high 
ortunities, if highly profitable firms 
arger negative 
 possibility of 
debt-overhang problem confronted by highly profitable firms.  
We classify my sample firms into 3 groups based on ROA measure, and we define the 
cent as lowly 
etween highly 
firms and highly 
profitable firms, the coefficient estimates on cash-flow indicator variable are 
statistically significant in the specifications of family-controlled firms, but not 
statistically significant in the specifications of independent firms. However the 
21  See Myers (1977)、Myers and Majluf (1984), for Japanese evidence see Otaki (2000), Arikawa, 
Miyajima and Saito (2003) 
 
hypothesis--the debt-overhang hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests th
excessive debt have 
because profits gained from the new investment would be appropriat
21
study, we focus on the measure of profitability to address this problem
profitability is associated with more investment opp
face more severe internal funds constraints of investment or have l
sensitivity to credit risk than lowly profitable firms, there implies the
highest 30 percent as highly profitable firms, while the lowest 30 per
profitable firms. Table 7 presents the comparison of regression results b
profitable firms and lowly profitable firms. For lowly profitable 
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ20鍨￿ 愀￿ magnitudes of the coefficients on cash-flow indicator variable are la
profitable firms than those for highly profitable firms. The coefficient estimates on d
ratio indicator are fairly similar for lowly profitable firms and 
rger for lowly 
ebt 
highly profitable firms in 
.   
These findings do not provide evidence that highly profitable firms with more 
potential investment opportunities pass up these opportunities owing to excessive debt 
 
 
The Asian crisis in 1997 severely damaged corporate sector of East Asian countries. As 
vernance can 
ing crisis, but also 
 highlight on 
variation of internal funds constraints of investment between these two periods. 
Table 8 presents the regression results. For pre-crisis period, the coefficient 
ignificant and positive in all 
olled 
iod, cash-flow 
indicator has a significant and positive effect on the investment in family-controlled 
firms group, but loses the significance in the independent firms group.   
The picture of differences on internal funds constraints of investment appears more 
clearly by comparing the estimations between pre-crisis period and post-crisis period. 
terms of significance and magnitude, while the former one is a little lower
problems. 
3.7 Comparison of Pre-crisis and Post-crisis 
outlined above, recent research has found evidence that corporate go
explain not only cross-country differences in performance dur
cross-firm differences in performance within countries.   
We divide my sample period into pre-crisis and post-crisis, and
estimates on cash-flow indicator variable are statistically s
specifications. However, the magnitude of the coefficient estimate for family-contr
firms is bigger than that for independent firms. For post-crisis per
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ21鍨￿ 愀￿ Taken together, our findings suggest that in family-controlled firms of the East Asian
countries, the central bank or key firm may not smoothly finance th
within the group and not properly function to mitigate the internal fund





promote the external finance through bank and capital markets alleviating greatly the 
internal funds constraints of investment.   
onstraints are 
he results are 
e intensified in 
post-crisis anarchy period. To investigate this paradox, we calculate the ratio of 
investment to cash-flow. Table 9 shows the results. In all countries in post-crisis period, 
, or compared 
erminant of 
rofit ratio. All 
four countries showed in this figure present a sharp drop in this ratio, and Korea, 
Malaysia and Thailand turn into minus value in 2000.22  
sult indicates that decline of investment after crisis is largely determined by 




22  We exclude Indonesia here, as it is difficult to estimate the real interest rate owing to the high 
inflation rate, especially, in 1998 when high inflation rate reached 75%.   
And compared with pre-crisis period, after crisis the internal funds c
relaxed for family-controlled firms, and released for independent firms. T
opposed in spite of the anticipation that the internal funds constraints ar
the median value of this ratio falls sharply compared with pre-crisis period
with decline of cash-flow, investment decreases much more.   
The reason pointed out is that the net profit ratio, which is the key det
investment, declines largely after crisis. Figure 1 shows the trend of net p
This re
environment, rather than internal funds constraints. 
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ22鍨￿ 愀￿ The Asian crisis that occurred in 1997 increased interest in East A
governance. In East Asia, there is a large number of firms with concentrat
and virtually controlled by certain families. In that context, shar





interests need not coincide with the interests of other investors in the firm, and they 
may possibly expropriate other shareholders.   
necessarily a 
ization will of 
 the view of 
corporate governance, Zaibatsu headquarters had efficiently monitored subsidiaries, 
while at the same time, were positively evaluated for functioning as the main funds 
vel data from 
he investment 
the pattern of 
investment in firms. We confirm 4 stylized facts: first, corporate investment in five East 
Asian countries is determined by profitability, cash-flow and credit risk, which supports 
e more severe 
e did not find 
rtunities pass 
up these opportunities owing to excessive debt problems. Fourth, comparison of 
pre-crisis and post-crisis periods confirms the result that family-controlled firms face 
more severe internal funds constraints of investment than independent firms. And 
internal funds constraints are more serious in the pre-crisis period than in the 
Originally, negative evaluation of family-controlled firms was not 
conventional argument. In fact, it is recognized that strong industrial
pre-war Japanese Zaibatsu led industry development, and, even from
supplier based on this monitoring.   
In this research, based on these two hypotheses and using firm-le
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand, we estimate t
function, and analyze quantitively the influence of family control on 
the theories relating to this aspect. Second, family-controlled firms fac
internal funds constraints on investment than independent firms. Third, w
evidence that highly profitable firms with more potential investment oppo
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ23鍨￿ 愀￿ post-crisis period. 
Our findings suggest that the mechanism in East Asian count
commonly assumed to permit smooth reallocation of money across inves
through the internal capital markets of family-controlled group firms, pro
ries, which is 
tment projects 
bably does not 
work well, and together with the financing difficulty from external capital markets, it 
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Argentina 0.00 0.65 0.15 0.05 0.15 0.00
Australia 0.65 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.25 0.00
Austria 0.05 0.15 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.10
Belgium 0.05 0.50 0.05 0.30 0.00 0.10
Canada 0.60 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00
Denmark 0.40 0.35 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.10
Finland 0.35 0.10 0.35 0.05 0.05 0.10
France 0.60 0.20 0.15 0.05 0.00 0.00
Germany 0.50 0.10 0.25 0.15 0.00 0.00
Greece 0.10 0.50 0.30 0.10 0.00 0.00
Hong Kong 0.10 0.70 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.10
Ireland 0.65 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.15
Israel 0.05 0.50 0.40 0.00 0.05 0.00
Italy 0.20 0.15 0.40 0.05 0.10 0.10
Japan 0.90 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mexico 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Netherlands 0.30 0.20 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.35
New Zealand 0.30 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.20 0.00
Norway 0.25 0.25 0.35 0.05 0.00 0.10
Portugal 0.10 0.45 0.25 0.15 0.00 0.05
Singapore 0.15 0.30 0.45 0.05 0.05 0.00
South Korea 0.55 0.20 0.15 0.00 0.05 0.05
Spain 0.35 0.15 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.00
Sweden 0.25 0.45 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.05
Switzerland 0.60 0.30 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05
United Kingdom 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 0.80 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 0.36 0.30 0.18 0.05 0.05 0.05
Note 1: source: La Porta, Lepez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999)
Note 2: the sample data are for the top 20 publicly traded corporations in terms of
market capitalization valuation at the end of 1995 in each country, and classified
into 6 categories accoding to the ultimate shareholder who holds at least 20% of
voting
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corporations






Hong Kong 330 (56.6) 7.0 66.7 1.4 5.2 19.8
Indonesia 178 (70.1) 5.1 71.5 8.2 2.0 13.2
Japan 1,240 (70.9) 79.8 9.7 0.8 6.5 3.2
Korea 345 (45.4) 43.2 48.4 1.6 0.7 6.1
Malaysia 238 (38.3) 10.3 67.2 13.4 2.3 6.7
The Philippines 120 (55.6) 19.2 44.6 2.1 7.5 26.7
Singapore 221 (83.1) 5.4 55.4 23.5 4.1 11.5
Taiwan 141 (36.9) 26.2 48.2 2.8 5.3 17.4
Thailand 167 (36.8) 6.6 61.6 8.0 8.6 15.3
Note 1: source: Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000)
Note 2: the sample data is collected as of the end of fiscal year 1996 or the closest possible data.
Controlling shareholders are defined at 20% cutoff. The number in parentheses is the ratio to
all publicly traded corporations in that country.















￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ29鍨￿ 愀￿ 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000
79 83 111 127 133 136 161
I/K Mean 30.55 25.87 31.51 30.40 15.23 6.51 11.60
M i n i m u m 0 . 1 40 . 2 20 . 1 60 . 4 70 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0
Maximum 202.35 226.06 246.02 187.87 191.99 94.53 121.83
Median 17.26 19.46 20.60 21.41 7.80 2.85 5.18
Std. Deviation 36.80 32.34 40.17 31.95 23.48 10.45 18.77
CASH/
0
K Mean 52.15 45.12 48.69 4.66 -10.90 33.45 26.48
Minimum 3.10 -0.92 -15.53 -341.21 -420.03 -401.78 -46.45
Maximum 504.87 398.26 844.52 352.84 486.92 746.21 121.86
Median 39.84 33.41 29.88 13.81 1.24 23.59 13.59
Std. Deviation 68.67 46.76 88.15 71.40 81.99 90.14 61.05
DEBT Mean 26.78 27.07 32.22 34.57 48.03 59.68 46.83
M i n i m u m 0 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0
Maximum 77.80 76.28 81.78 96.69 113.17 251.67 218.39
Median 24.43 27.21 31.89 33.96 51.18 58.89 46.23
Std. Deviation 18.02 18.76 19.05 20.01 24.90 42.98 39.67
136 172 190 222 242 258 348
I/
0
K Mean 16.16 21.74 21.99 20.17 11.91 10.86 17.20
M i n i m u m 0 . 0 60 . 4 30 . 1 90 . 1 60 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0
Maximum 106.09 130.30 140.59 250.16 207.31 233.43 291.31
Median 11.29 15.94 15.44 13.58 6.98 5.39 7.25
Std. Deviation 17.80 20.18 21.05 22.04 21.99 19.31 34.74
CASH/
0
K Mean 28.73 22.10 14.86 8.84 -1.62 17.65 31.50
Minimum 0.41 -104.49 -103.89 -132.48 -414.72 -477.48 -403.22
Maximum 244.53 276.87 97.75 138.60 227.70 404.36 679.51
Median 19.62 17.08 14.81 11.29 11.47 18.00 18.32
Std. Deviation 37.91 29.57 21.29 28.46 58.15 59.87 91.26
DEBT Mean 42.23 40.73 42.89 44.32 48.71 45.73 35.93
M i n i m u m 0 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0
Maximum 92.82 86.69 247.95 267.23 109.97 195.06 191.13
Median 42.96 42.69 44.24 45.27 50.75 44.49 32.30
Std. Deviation 17.75 17.60 22.06 23.23 20.76 28.76 27.25
191 204 287 344 378 379 395
I/
0
K Mean 23.52 23.05 29.40 22.33 16.61 8.90 6.53
M i n i m u m 0 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0
Maximum 223.70 192.65 294.86 200.05 276.14 225.65 117.13
Median 12.50 12.93 15.87 13.21 8.43 3.96 3.53
Std. Deviation 33.57 30.74 42.06 28.15 31.36 18.65 10.64
CASH/
0
K Mean 65.61 57.61 53.27 34.40 -2.83 11.25 13.81
Minimum -28.80 -176.73 -119.96 -209.57 -453.72 -398.34 -203.73
Maximum 915.31 759.40 822.47 618.21 392.16 565.57 410.86
Median 27.84 30.93 29.06 22.07 10.03 12.69 11.43
Std. Deviation 135.86 100.99 96.85 75.02 71.88 75.71 43.71
DEBT Mean 15.23 18.32 20.62 22.83 26.99 32.12 33.78
M i n i m u m 0 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0
Maximum 73.86 92.07 84.56 80.91 286.94 173.26 277.65
Median 9.80 14.38 18.26 21.65 26.40 29.62 26.80
Std. Deviation 15.54 17.40 17.43 18.31 23.37 26.73 35.80
44 46 72 81 86 84 88
I/
0
K Mean 24.35 18.98 31.83 35.57 14.98 8.17 10.24
M i n i m u m 0 . 0 00 . 8 40 . 0 00 . 0 10 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0
Maximum 203.23 77.63 120.93 246.65 251.24 120.17 155.68
Median 12.16 13.77 23.61 24.67 9.23 4.21 3.74
Std. Deviation 38.70 17.89 29.48 44.83 28.62 14.53 20.19
CASH/
0
K Mean 78.16 62.56 66.92 76.18 40.52 38.94 34.20
Minimum -48.49 -251.72 -402.02 -244.87 -149.39 -175.72 -356.20
Maximum 734.21 243.09 267.10 942.71 679.90 713.82 515.61
Median 46.78 52.05 51.46 39.52 25.83 25.01 22.93
Std. Deviation 120.84 75.88 85.69 136.04 89.74 94.55 90.35
DEBT Mean 16.05 14.98 18.60 21.37 25.78 23.96 25.22
M i n i m u m 0 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0
Maximum 67.03 64.84 69.06 65.82 76.93 70.32 105.16
Median 10.00 12.18 16.12 18.77 22.97 20.33 20.83
Std. Deviation 17.37 15.45 16.42 18.35 19.16 19.42 22.62
132 150 163 183 184 187 191
I/
0
K Mean 29.93 24.57 20.37 17.89 8.38 6.16 7.13
M i n i m u m 0 . 1 20 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 2 10 . 0 . 0 00 . 0
Maximum 287.32 115.45 101.58 264.74 152.31 97.21 71.94
Median 17.06 17.57 12.50 8.20 2.80 2.88 3.30
Std. Deviation 39.58 23.73 22.15 28.37 17.91 10.78 10.61
CASH/
00 0
K Mean 57.15 49.38 52.00 30.49 38.29 27.51 26.81
Minimum -19.78 -21.05 -140.66 -145.45 -277.19 -335.93 -226.77
Maximum 387.75 396.17 973.16 787.74 789.92 995.78 493.05
Median 38.35 31.95 29.51 20.48 25.37 20.54 23.51
Std. Deviation 59.33 63.70 100.10 80.43 107.67 113.03 72.02
DEBT Mean 31.11 32.40 36.38 38.14 48.02 42.71 43.02
M i n i m u m 0 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0
Maximum 83.71 88.43 112.87 86.19 126.65 129.91 221.15
Median 32.66 33.21 37.63 41.61 52.99 45.08 39.02
Std. Deviation 19.63 19.82 20.64 21.17 30.43 31.43 39.51
Note 1: source: Worldsco
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Dependent Variable: Iit /K it-１
Ⅰ- A Ⅰ- B Ⅰ- C Ⅰ- D
ROAit-1 - Rit-1 0.0836*** 0.0745*** 0.0839*** 0.0740***
(5.68) (4.85) (5.70) (4.81)
CASH it/K it-１ 0.0587*** 0.0631*** 0.0588*** 0.0631***
(5.74) (6.13) (5.75) (6.12)
DEBTit-1 -0.0379* -0.0445* -0.0410* -0.0463*
(-2.11) (-2.40) (-2.28) (-2.50)
D95 -1.9912 -2.0027 -2.2987 -2.2595
(-1.15) (-1.15) (-1.32) (-1.30)
D96 -2.613 -2.567 -2.9479 -2.8431
(-1.53) (-1.50) (-1.71) (-1.65)
D97 -0.6489 -0.6068 -0.7281 -0.6532
(-0.39) (-0.36) (-0.43) (-0.39)
D98 -10.8227*** -10.6954*** -10.9474*** -10.8063***
(-6.47) (-6.39) (-6.53) (-6.44)
D99 -15.7953*** -15.5743*** -15.9604*** -15.7212***
(-9.50) (-9.35) (-9.58) (-9.41)
D00 -14.3631*** -13.9738*** -14.5443*** -14.1279***
(-8.27) (-8.01) (-8.35) (-8.07)
Indonesia dummy 2.1002 2.4877
(1.34) (1.58)
Malaysia dummy -2.0543 -1.6172
(-1.38) (-1.08)
Philippine dummy -3.2654 -2.8344
(-1.50) (-1.30)
Thailand dummy -3.6748* -3.2365*
(-2.29) (-2.00)
Total assets 0.4263* 0.3916*
(2.24) (2.04)
Intercept 16.9992* 18.1628** 17.0663* 17.9470*
(2.42) (2.59) (2.43) (2.56)
Overall R-squared 0.1882 0.195 0.1907 0.1972
Number of Observations 2186 2186 2179 2179
Note 1: regression results of Industry dummies as explanatory variables have been omitted. 
Note 3: t-values are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients.
Note 2: asterisks denote significance levels: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at
the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.





￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ31鍨￿ 愀￿  
Family-controlled Firms Independent Firms
Period Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation t-test
I/K 1994～1996 24.13 29.17 20.84 19.19 **
1997～2000 12.72 19.63 11.87 17.88
Whole period 16.80 24.11 15.08 18.85 **
ROA 1994～1996 21.19 25.99 25.83 31.72 **
1997～2000 13.26 27.16 14.98 36.36
Whole period 15.79 27.04 18.52 35.27 **
R 1994～1996 3.05 7.85 1.97 5.32 **
1997～2000 2.51 17.34 1.20 16.14
Whole period 2.70 14.74 1.47 13.40 **
CASH/K 1994～1996 39.89 67.16 48.25 84.28
1997～2000 16.35 70.72 24.96 74.42 **
Whole period 24.98 70.34 33.53 78.95 ***
DEBT 1994～1996 32.67 20.75 29.36 20.25 **
1997～2000 42.32 29.69 38.73 30.04 **
Whole period 38.91 27.26 35.37 27.31 ***
Note 2: data is reported in percent .
Note 3: larger values with significant difference in the t-test are displayed by bold font. 
Note 1: asterisks denote significance levels of t-tests: * indicates significance at the 10%
level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.












￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ32鍨￿ 愀￿  
1. For Family-controlled Firms
Dependent Variable: Iit /K it-１
Ⅰ- A Ⅰ－B Ⅰ- C Ⅰ- D
ROAit-1 - Rit-1 0.0993*** 0.0860*** 0.1004*** 0.0851***
(5.02) (4.16) (5.08) (4.12)
CASH it/K it-１ 0.0736*** 0.0779*** 0.0730*** 0.0772***
(5.71) (6.00) (5.67) (5.95)
DEBTit-1 -0.0189 -0.0264 -0.0235 -0.0287
(-0.83) (-1.12) (-1.03) (-1.22)
D95 -3.1996 -3.0973 -3.8445 -3.6603
(-1.43) (-1.38) (-1.71) (-1.63)
D96 -5.1540* -4.9704* -5.8815** -5.6129*
(-2.33) (-2.24) (-2.64) (-2.51)
D97 -1.5612 -1.4138 -1.8308 -1.6107
(-0.73) (-0.66) (-0.85) (-0.75)
D98 -12.5734*** -12.3274*** -12.8873*** -12.6133***
(-5.84) (-5.72) (-5.97) (-5.84)
D99 -18.2136*** -17.8218*** -18.5743*** -18.1423***
(-8.51) (-8.30) (-8.65) (-8.42)
D00 -16.3593*** -15.8066*** -16.6770*** -16.0748***
(-7.29) (-7.01) (-7.41) (-7.10)
Indonesia dummy 3.3914 4.2572*
(1.69) (2.11)
Malaysia dummy -1.7842 -0.8304
(-0.94) (-0.43)
Philippine dummy -1.3878 -0.8023
(-0.44) (-0.26)
Thailand dummy -3.1865 -2.2685
(-1.45) (-1.03)
Total assets 1.1877** 1.2150**
(2.70) (2.71)
Intercept 22.2665* 22.1293* 22.5960* 22.3281*
(2.00) (1.99) (2.04) (2.02)
Overall R-squared 0.1931 0.1995 0.1983 0.2049
Number of Observation 1583 1583 1576 1576
Note 1: regression results of Industry dummies as explanatory variables have been omitted
Note 3: t-values are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients.
Table 6. Regressions of Basic Investment Functions for Family-controlled Firms and
Independent Firms
Note 2: asterisks denote significance levels: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at
the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.
 
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ33鍨￿ 愀￿  
2. For Independent Firms
Dependent Variable: Iit /K it-１
Ⅰ- A Ⅰ－B Ⅰ- C Ⅰ- D
ROAit-1 - Rit-1 0.0611*** 0.0642*** 0.0611*** 0.0639***
(3.50) (3.53) (3.50) (3.51)
CASH it/K it-１ 0.0135 0.0161 0.014 0.0163
(0.96) (1.14) (0.99) (1.16)
DEBTit-1 -0.1140*** -0.1149*** -0.1172*** -0.1170***
(-4.43) (-4.48) (-4.54) (-4.54)
D95 1.1928 0.8798 1.1339 0.8657
(0.54) (0.40) (0.52) (0.39)
D96 3.5759 3.2767 3.4916 3.25
(1.67) (1.53) (1.64) (1.52)
D97 1.152 0.9103 1.2316 0.9876
(0.54) (0.43) (0.58) (0.46)
D98 -6.1061** -6.2435** -6.0296** -6.1773**
(-2.85) (-2.92) (-2.82) (-2.89)
D99 -9.5851*** -9.6976*** -9.5606*** -9.6685***
(-4.52) (-4.58) (-4.52) (-4.57)
D00 -8.9869*** -9.1117*** -9.0583*** -9.1410***
(-4.10) (-4.15) (-4.14) (-4.17)
Indonesia dummy -2.9269 -2.6483
(-1.31) (-1.17)
Malaysia dummy -3.9384 -3.6166
(-1.72) (-1.55)
Philippine dummy -4.6715 -4.4748
(-1.77) (-1.68)
Thailand dummy -5.8370** -5.5265**
(-3.04) (-2.81)
Total assets 0.2129 0.1355
(1.42) (0.91)
Intercept 12.1851 16.2672* 12.1326 15.8989*
(1.95) (2.52) (1.93) (2.44)
Overall R-squared 0.3665 0.3836 0.3696 0.3847
Number of Observations 603 603 603 603
Note 1: regression results of Industry dummies as explanatory variables have been omit
Note 3: t-values are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients.
Table 6. Regressions of Basic Investment Functions for Family-controlled Firms and
Independent Firms  (continued )
Note 2: asterisks denote significance levels: * indicates significance at the 10% level, **




￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ34鍨￿ 愀￿  
1. Highly Profitable Firms
Dependent Variable: Iit /K it-１
All Sample Firms Family-controlled Firms Independent Firms
ROAit-1 - Rit-1 0.0634* 0.1079* 0.0202
(2.23) (2.53) (0.67)
CASH it/K it-１ 0.0438** 0.0613** 0.0119
(2.77) (2.82) (0.58)
DEBTit-1 -0.0441 0.0064 -0.1598**
(-1.17) (0.13) (-3.12)
D95 1.0969 -0.6857 4.6895
(0.26) (-0.12) (0.98)
D96 2.407 -2.8661 11.4632*
(0.58) (-0.52) (2.40)
D97 7.3579 5.6609 10.4907*
(1.85) (1.06) (2.28)
D98 -6.7469 -7.6772 -3.5456
(-1.65) (-1.40) (-0.75)
D99 -12.3018** -14.3493** -6.3274
(-3.03) (-2.62) (-1.33)
D00 -11.1732** -12.0827* -5.5299
(-2.58) (-2.08) (-1.10)
Indonesia dummy -5.0634 -8.4959 -0.6731
(-1.49) (-1.79) (-0.14)
Malaysia dummy -1.5442 -1.1854 -8.5428
(-0.45) (-0.26) (-1.46)
Philippine dummy -2.0071 -1.9586 -5.0191
(-0.38) (-0.22) (-0.72)
Thailand dummy -10.9854** -13.6898* -12.9354*
(-2.69) (-2.39) (-2.33)
Total assets -0.196 -0.138 3.0913
(-0.24) (-0.15) (0.87)
Intercept 25.5844 3.148 8.594
(1.53) (0.11) (0.69)
Overall R-squared 0.2319 0.2252 0.5318
Number of Observation 607 425 182
Note 1: regression results of Industry dummies as explanatory variables have been omitt
Note 3: t-values are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients.
Table 7. Regressions of Basic Investment Functions for Highly Profitable Firms and
Lowly Profitable Firms
Note 2: asterisks denote significance levels: * indicates significance at the 10% level, **
at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.
 
 
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ35鍨￿ 愀￿  
2. Lowly Profitable Firms
Dependent Variable: Iit /K it-１
All Sample Firms Family-controlled Firms Independent Firms
ROAit-1 - Rit-1 0.0826* 0.0837* 0.1108**
(2.57) (1.97) (2.82)
CASH it/K it-１ 0.1205*** 0.1377*** 0.0384
(5.17) (4.58) (1.25)
DEBTit-1 -0.038 -0.0275 -0.1217*
(-1.18) (-0.69) (-2.29)
D95 -3.4168 -4.0189 -3.2073
(-1.29) (-1.14) (-1.07)
D96 -5.8146* -7.9584* -1.7964
(-2.23) (-2.26) (-0.61)
D97 -4.2862 -4.4142 -6.0880*
(-1.65) (-1.27) (-2.06)
D98 -11.1701*** -13.1283*** -6.9715*
(-4.23) (-3.72) (-2.26)
D99 -15.4139*** -17.8168*** -11.2699***
(-5.79) (-5.05) (-3.59)
D00 -13.2375*** -15.6722*** -10.0893**
(-4.80) (-4.28) (-3.13)
Indonesia dummy 4.6031 8.8892* -2.1009
(1.61) (2.37) (-0.44)
Malaysia dummy -1.8733 -0.4964 -4.686
(-0.64) (-0.13) (-0.86)
Philippine dummy -3.2997 -0.171 -6.9577
(-0.79) (-0.03) (-1.43)
Thailand dummy -3.4297 -0.3706 -6.1931
(-1.19) (-0.09) (-1.39)
Total assets 0.1323 0.7476 -0.0539
(0.55) (0.76) (-0.24)
Intercept 17.3391 20.7345 30.1474***
(1.29) (1.78) (3.42)
Overall R-squared 0.2913 0.3324 0.4055
Number of Observations 721 515 206
Note 1: regression results of Industry dummies as explanatory variables have been omitted
Note 3: t-values are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients.
Table 7. Regressions of Basic Investment Functions for Highly Profitable Firms and
Lowly Profitable Firms (continued )
Note 2: asterisks denote significance levels: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at




￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ36鍨￿ 愀￿  
1. Pre-crisis （1994～1996）
Dependent Variable: Iit /K it-１
All Sample Firms Family-controlled Firms Independent Firms
ROAit-1 - Rit-1 -0.0601 -0.0519 -0.0002
(-1.43) (-0.89) (-0.00)
CASH it/K it-１ 0.3593*** 0.3838*** 0.1575*
(7.97) (6.82) (2.11)
DEBTit-1 -0.0051 0.0377 -0.1989*
(-0.09) (0.52) (-2.10)
D95 -1.374 -2.1062 0.5988
(-0.72) (-0.86) (0.25)
D96 -1.589 -3.8923 2.831
(-0.83) (-1.55) (1.20)
Indonesia dummy 0.2862 3.7148 -7.7388
(0.09) (0.90) (-1.53)
Malaysia dummy -2.2583 0.4427 -11.286
(-0.65) (0.10) (-1.89)
Philippine dummy -12.6402* -13.7668 -13.9018*
(-2.37) (-1.53) (-2.36)
Thailand dummy -3.8944 -2.0158 -9.7853*
(-1.21) (-0.45) (-2.27)
Total assets 1.2019** 1.9278* 1.5789*
(2.63) (2.25) (1.96)
Intercept 8.8547 12.8002 20.9169
(0.67) (0.53) (1.67)
Overall R-squared 0.2335 0.2535 0.4969
Number of Observations 710 512 198
Note 1: regression results of Industry dummies as explanatory variables have been omitted. 
Note 3: t-values are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients.
Table 8. Regressions of Basic Investment Functions for Pre-crisis Period and Post-crisis
Period
Note 2: asterisks denote significance levels: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the







￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ37鍨￿ 愀￿  
2. Post-crisis （1997～2000）
Dependent Variable: Iit /K it-１
All Sample Firms Family-controlled Firms Independent Firms
ROAit-1 - Rit-1 0.0611*** 0.0660** 0.0534**
(3.88) (3.17) (2.73)
CASH it/K it-１ 0.0360*** 0.0477*** 0.0029
(3.82) (3.97) (0.22)
DEBTit-1 -0.0455* -0.0396 -0.0856***
(-2.57) (-1.73) (-3.61)
D98 -10.4862*** -11.4294*** -7.3979***
(-9.47) (-8.07) (-5.04)
D99 -15.0177*** -16.4856*** -10.7071***
(-13.46) (-11.55) (-7.23)
D00 -13.7487*** -15.0327*** -10.1226***
(-11.36) (-9.66) (-6.37)
Indonesia dummy 1.7822 2.9253 -0.9066
(1.07) (1.33) (-0.41)
Malaysia dummy -1.4679 -1.6444 -0.8616
(-0.99) (-0.83) (-0.40)
Philippine dummy 0.0013 1.0882 -1.6068
0.00 (0.35) (-0.65)
Thailand dummy -4.4302** -4.2808 -4.2991*
(-2.72) (-1.84) (-2.37)
Total assets 0.2301 0.7406 0.1366
(1.23) (1.54) (1.04)
Intercept 19.5682** 22.1123* 15.4761*
(2.81) (2.03) (2.52)
Overall R-squared 0.209 0.2126 0.378
Number of Observations 1469 1064 405
Note 1: regression results of Industry dummies as explanatory variables have been omitted. 
Note 3: t-values are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients.
Table 8. Regressions of Basic Investment Functions for Pre-crisis Period and Post-crisis
Period (continued)
Note 2: asterisks denote significance levels: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the







￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ38鍨￿ 愀￿  
94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 Pre-crisis Post-crisis Whole period
Indonesia Mean 0.16 0.88 1.23 0.75 -0.82 0.33 0.54 0.83 0.27 0.44
Minimum -64.36 -0.06 -0.58 -13.64 -101.99 -6.40 -18.16 -64.36 -101.99 -101.99
Maximum 4.53 4.70 11.76 20.63 15.91 15.55 34.27 11.76 34.27 34.27
Median 0.56 0.52 0.81 0.23 -0.01 0.13 0.03 0.63 0.07 0.23
Std. Deviation 7.20 0.98 1.49 4.04 9.34 1.48 3.79 3.81 5.12 4.75
Korea Mean 0.71 1.14 -2.02 12.20 1.26 0.69 0.62 -0.33 2.36 1.76
Minimum -21.05 -54.66 -874.65 -32.43 -15.91 -19.63 -98.32 -874.65 -98.32 -874.65
Maximum 6.49 16.77 54.51 2613.84 64.31 36.99 68.07 54.51 2613.84 2613.84
Median 0.84 1.26 1.44 1.00 0.29 0.33 0.41 1.21 0.38 0.52
Std. Deviation 3.30 4.89 58.50 166.74 6.16 2.45 5.47 38.84 62.23 57.80
Malaysia Mean 0.61 1.63 1.27 1.01 0.04 0.66 0.73 1.23 0.62 0.82
Minimum -80.50 -19.48 -162.91 -15.87 -448.67 -23.56 -27.65 -162.91 -448.67 -448.67
Maximum 57.68 91.90 140.13 37.98 79.46 58.22 234.49 140.13 234.49 234.49
Median 0.50 0.55 0.61 0.49 0.20 0.15 0.19 0.55 0.23 0.33
Std. Deviation 7.32 7.11 13.04 3.44 23.51 3.82 9.94 10.03 12.60 11.83
Philippines Mean 0.28 0.54 -1.08 0.49 0.26 -0.10 0.15 -0.20 0.19 0.06
Minimum -1.95 -1.11 -147.03 -54.06 -9.84 -11.47 -20.81 -147.03 -54.06 -147.03
Maximum 3.34 6.34 12.18 24.55 14.43 1.72 11.37 12.18 24.55 24.55
Median 0.20 0.31 0.34 0.45 0.16 0.11 0.03 0.28 0.14 0.20
Std. Deviation 0.69 0.88 15.54 6.61 2.16 1.55 2.20 10.08 3.50 6.42
Thailand Mean 0.81 -0.11 0.18 -0.87 1.03 -0.70 0.33 0.27 -0.01 0.09
Minimum -10.97 -150.07 -64.48 -260.33 -9.98 -147.57 -7.82 -150.07 -260.33 -260.33
Maximum 5.86 10.53 19.24 55.22 150.01 6.00 54.18 19.24 150.01 150.01
Median 0.51 0.50 0.45 0.21 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.49 0.09 0.19
Std. Deviation 1.49 11.48 5.78 19.19 10.86 10.54 3.12 7.52 11.57 10.28
Note 1: source: WorldscopeDatabase













Note 2: data is reported in percent .
￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ39鍨￿ 愀￿ ￿票婢愀￿漀Ĩ40鍨￿ 愀￿ 
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